Shielding Corporate Interests From Public Dissent:  An Examination of the Undesirability and Unconstitutionality of  Eco-Terrorism  Legislation by Goodman, Jared S.
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 7
2009
Shielding Corporate Interests From Public Dissent:
An Examination of the Undesirability and
Unconstitutionality of "Eco-Terrorism" Legislation
Jared S. Goodman
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Jared S. Goodman, Shielding Corporate Interests From Public Dissent: An Examination of the Undesirability and Unconstitutionality of "Eco-
Terrorism" Legislation, 16 J. L. & Pol'y (2008).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol16/iss2/7
  
 
823 
SHIELDING CORPORATE INTERESTS 
FROM PUBLIC DISSENT:  
AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
UNDESIRABILITY AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF  
“ECO-TERRORISM” LEGISLATION 
 
Jared S. Goodman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Every year, in the United States alone, more than nine billion 
animals1 are slaughtered for food.2 More than 100 million are 
subjected to painful procedures or toxic exposures in laboratories 
on college campuses and research facilities throughout the country 
for biomedical research and to test the safety of cosmetics, 
household cleaners and other consumer products.3 Hundreds of 
millions more are killed or exploited for hunting and entertainment 
and to manufacture fur and leather clothing.4 “More than 300 
                                                           
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A., Binghamton University, 
2005. Thanks to the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their efforts 
and Will Potter for his comprehensive investigative journalism. Special thanks 
to Jenny Deffes and the Goodman family for their absolute love and support. 
1 For the purposes of this Note, the term “animal” will refer to only birds 
and nonhuman mammals. 
2 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS VIII-36 (2005), available at http://www.usda.gov/ 
nass/pubs/agr05/agstats2005.pdf. 
3 See Madhusree Mukerjee, Speaking for the Animals, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN, Aug. 2004, at 96–97; In Defense of Animals: The Truth About 
Vivisection, http://www.vivisectioninfo.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
4 GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD 
OR THE DOG? xx–xxi (2000) [hereinafter YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG]. 
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mammals and birds die each time your heart beats.”5 
The magnitude of this institutionalized exploitation leaves 
animal rights activists with what may seem to be an unattainable 
goal: societal recognition of the inherent value of the lives of 
animals. Activists who wish to provide immediate sanctuary to 
these animals have begun to employ nonviolent,6 but often illegal, 
tactics against animal enterprises.7 The goal of these tactics, which 
range from demonstrations at the offices and homes of company 
officials to property damage, is to inflict economic damage on those 
who profit from the exploitation of animals, ultimately making it 
unprofitable to continue with their practices.8 
Fearing the increasing intensity and effectiveness of the 
domestic animal rights movement, various private groups have 
urged Congress to broaden the reach and increase the penalties of 
existing federal legislation applicable exclusively to animal 
advocates.9 One result of this corporate campaign, led primarily by 
                                                           
5 Steven M. Wise, Animal Rights, One Step at a Time, in ANIMAL 
RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 19, 19 (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2005). 
6 The definition of “violence” with regards to activism is currently up for 
debate. However, for the purposes of this Note, “violence” may be defined as 
“physical violence against animals, human or non-.”  Posting of Justin 
Goodman to Connecticut for Animals, http://connecticutforanimals.blogspot. 
com/2007/09/on-non-violent-direct-action.html (Sept. 9, 2007, 01:09 EST) 
(citing GENE SHARP, THERE ARE REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES, 1 n.1 (2003)). 
Physical obstructions and forms of property destruction that do not carry a 
substantial risk of injury will be considered nonviolent direct action and outside 
the purview of this framework. 
7 The term “animal enterprise” refers to: a commercial or academic 
enterprise that uses or sells animals or animal products for profit, food or fiber 
production, agriculture, education, research or testing; a zoo, aquarium, animal 
shelter, pet store, breeder, furrier, circus, or rodeo, or other lawful competitive 
animal event; or any fair or similar event intended to advance agricultural arts 
and sciences. Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act § 43(d)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 43 
(2006). 
8 See Animal Liberation Front, The ALF Credo and Guidelines, 
http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credo.htm (last visited Feb. 
21, 2008). 
9 The National Association for Biomedical Research (“NABR”) has been 
credited with ensuring the passage of animal enterprise protection legislation 
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representatives of the agricultural, biomedical research and 
pharmaceutical industries, has been the enactment of the federal 
crime of “animal enterprise terrorism.”10 With this legislation, the 
government has branded and successfully prosecuted individuals 
who have engaged in nonviolent activism as “eco-terrorists.”11 
Industry groups have taken full advantage of that characterization 
to demonize those who associate with, ideologically support, or 
simply refuse to condemn the actions of “eco-terrorists.”12 
Part I of this Note will provide a brief overview of the history 
of animal rights theory and the current philosophies behind the 
belief that animals should be afforded certain moral and legal rights. 
It will also examine the operational methods of animal rights 
activists and illustrate their role in achieving this underlying goal. 
Part II of this Note will discuss the impropriety of characterizing 
activists as “terrorists” in order to promote a particular political 
agenda. Part III will outline the measures animal enterprises and 
industries involved in animal exploitation have taken to urge the 
federal government to put an end to the activist tactics that have 
successfully caused them to sustain economic loss. Specifically, it 
will examine “animal enterprise terrorism” legislation13 and how it 
                                                           
through Congress. See, e.g., Edward J. Walsh, The Animal Enterprise 
Protection Act: A Scientist’s Perspective Brings the Law into Focus, 
http://www.naiaonline.org/body/articles/archives/animalenterprise.htm (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2008). NABR is an organization comprised of hundreds of 
universities, medical and veterinary schools, health agencies, professional 
societies, pharmaceutical companies and other animal research-related firms. 
NABR: About Us, http://www.nabr.org/about.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
10 See id.; Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 
(West 2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006). 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 53–67, 89–114. 
12 For example, the Center for Consumer Freedom has accused mainstream 
animal advocacy organizations such as the Humane Society of the United States 
and the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine of “consorting with 
terrorists” for allowing nonviolent direct action organization Hugs For Puppies 
to set up an informational table at an animal advocacy conference. Will Potter, 
Industry Group Says Mainstream Animal Advocates “Consorting With 
Terrorists,” http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/2007/08/15/tafa-terrorists/ 
(Aug. 15, 2007). 
13 Specifically, Part III will analyze the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2006), passed on November 27, 2006, as well as its 
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has been used successfully to prosecute the nonviolent activism of 
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (“SHAC USA”). Part 
III will also discuss the “terrorism enhancement” penalties 
applicable to nonviolent activism. Part IV will examine how the 
application of such ideology-specific legislation has encroached 
upon traditionally protected speech. Finally, Part V concludes that 
“animal enterprise terrorism” legislation should be a concern not 
only of animal rights activists, but of all advocates of social or 
political change because of a subsequent chilling effect on the 
exercise of free speech. 
I.   BACKGROUND 
A.   Animal Rights Theory 
Animal advocacy can be traced as far back as the sixth century 
B.C. when Greek philosopher Pythagoras urged respect for animals 
because he believed in the transmigration of souls between human 
and nonhuman animals.14 In the 18th century, English philosopher 
and legal theorist Jeremy Bentham rejected the position that 
because nonhuman animals allegedly lack rationality or the ability 
to communicate using language, humans may use them as a means 
to their own desired ends and owe them no moral obligations.15 
Instead, Bentham suggested that the primary characteristic relevant 
to the attribution of moral consideration is sentience, i.e., the 
ability to experience sensation or feeling.16 
                                                           
precursor, the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 
(West 2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006). 
14 ANGUS TAYLOR, ANIMALS AND ETHICS 34 (2003) (“Pythagoras . . . 
rejected the claim that we have nothing significant in common with animals and 
therefore cannot be said to treat them unjustly. [He] . . . believed that animals 
may be former human beings, now reincarnated in non-human form.”). 
15 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 283 n.b (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press 
1996) (1789). 
16 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(4th ed. 2000). In suggesting that the mistreatment of nonhuman animals was 
akin to the evils of racial discrimination, Bentham stated: 
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However, it was not until 1983 that a thorough argument in 
favor of animal rights was presented by American philosopher 
Tom Regan in his book, The Case for Animal Rights.17 The general 
theory of animal rights is based upon the premise that 
individualshuman and non-human animalsare due equal respect 
for their equal inherent value.18 To Regan, the fundamental attribute 
all humans share is that each of us is the “subject-of-a-life;” that is, 
a conscious creature with an individual welfare important to us, 
logically independent of our usefulness to anyone else.19 Humans 
have, inter alia, beliefs and desires, perception, memory, a sense of 
the future, feelings of pain and pleasure, preference- and welfare-
interests, and the ability to act in furtherance of those goals.20 
Regan argues that because the same is true of certain animals, such 
as mammals aged one year or more, they too are subjects-of-a-life 
                                                           
The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no 
reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the 
caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the 
number of the legs, [or] the villosity of the skin . . . are reasons equally 
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate? [A] full 
grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a 
more conversible animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a 
month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? 
[T]he question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can 
they suffer? 
BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 283 n.b. 
17 TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983). Prior to the 
1970’s, animal advocacy was largely concerned with the welfare of animals. 
Animal welfare, as opposed to animal rights, “concerns the treatment of animals 
and has as its central focus the regulation of animal exploitation. Animal welfare 
maintains that it is acceptable to use nonhumans as long as we treat them 
‘humanely.’” Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach—
Mission Statement [hereinafter The Abolitionist Approach], 
http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/index.php?page_id=54 (list visited Feb. 
21, 2008). 
18 See, e.g., The Abolitionist Approach, supra note 17 (“[A]ll sentient 
beings should have at least one right—the right not to be treated as property. If 
we recognized this one right, we would be compelled to abolish 
institutionalized animal exploitation.”). 
19 REGAN, supra note 17, at 243. 
20 Id. 
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with their own inherent value.21 Finally, it follows that the basic 
moral right of all who possess inherent value is the right never to be 
harmed “on the grounds that all those affected by the outcome will 
thereby secure ‘the best’ aggregate balance of intrinsic values (e.g., 
pleasures) over intrinsic disvalues (e.g., pains).”22 
Similarly, law professor Gary Francione maintains that true 
recognition of animal rights requires the complete abolition of 
animal exploitation.23 However, contrary to Regan, Francione 
argues that a theory of abolition should not require that animals 
have any cognitive characteristic beyond sentience to be full 
members of the moral community, entitled to the basic moral right 
not to be the property of humans.24 Francione’s theory has three 
components: first, society regards it as a moral imperative to 
protect all humans from the suffering caused by being used 
exclusively as the resource of another; second, animals and humans 
are similar in that they are sentient beings; and third, if animal 
interests in not suffering are to be morally significant, then the 
principle of equal consideration demands that we extend the basic 
right not to be treated as things to animals.25 Simply, if animal 
interests are to be taken seriously, we must treat their similar 
interests in a similar fashion.26 
Thus, because the theory of animal rights rejects treating 
animals as property, it “rejects completely the institutionalized 
exploitation of animals, which is made possible only because 
animals have property status.”27 The theory ensures that relevant 
animal interests are completely protected and not sacrificed for 
                                                           
21 Id. at 78. This concept is further illustrated by the inherent value ascribed 
to humans who are not capable of rational thought, such as the infants referred to 
by Bentham and the severely mentally impaired. See BENTHAM, supra note 15, 
at 283 n.b. 
22  REGAN, supra note 17, at 286. 
23 Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 108, 108 (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2005). 
24 Id. at 121, 124–25. 
25 YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG, supra note 4, at xxvi. 
26 Id. at 99. 
27 GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF 
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 2 (1996). 
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human benefit, no matter how “humane” the exploitation or how 
stringent the safeguards from “unnecessary suffering.”28 To deny 
animals this one basic right would be speciesist29a prejudice 
which, like racism or sexism, is based upon a morally irrelevant 
physical characteristic. “It is a bias, arbitrary as any other.”30 
B.   Direct Action and the Role of Animal Advocates 
Just as nineteenth-century white abolitionists in the 
[United States] worked across racial lines to create new 
forms of solidarity, so the new freedom fighters reach 
across species lines to help our fellow beings in the animal 
world.31 
 
When conventional methods of achieving social and political 
change are believed to be slow and inadequate, activists often 
employ direct action tactics.32 “[D]irect action seeks to create such 
a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has 
constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.”33 
                                                           
28 Id. 
29 Speciesism is defined as “Human intolerance or discrimination on the 
basis of species, especially as manifested by cruelty to or exploitation of 
animals.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(4th ed. 2000). 
30 Wise, supra note 5, at 26. 
31 Steven Best & Anthony J. Nocella II, Behind the Mask: Uncovering the 
Animal Liberation Front, in TERRORISTS OR FREEDOM FIGHTERS 9, 12 (Steven 
Best & Anthony J. Nocella II eds., 2004). Steven Best is Associate Professor of 
Humanities and Philosophy at the University of Texas, El Paso, and is co-
founder and Chief Editor of the peer-reviewed online journal, Critical Animal 
Studies Journal. Dr. Steve Best, Biography, http://www.drstevebest.org/ 
InPages/Personal.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008). 
32 Examples of conventional, indirect methods of affecting change are 
collecting signatures on a petition, writing letters to representatives in office, or 
voting for those who assure the public that they will provide a remedy at some 
point in the future if elected. 
33 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), 
available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/popular_requests/frequentdocs/ 
birmingham.pdf. 
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These tactics are intended to have an immediate impact on a 
problem or its causes, and can include legal and illegal activities, 
such as demonstrations, boycotts, civil disobedience, vandalism 
and property damage.34 
In the animal rights context, activists often resort to illegal 
direct action because conventional advocacy alone is insufficient to 
rescue the countless animals facing present dangers.35 Activists 
have resorted to illegal actions because of the substantial cultural, 
political, economic, legal, and psychological impediments to their 
agenda of abolishing institutionalized animal oppression and 
obtaining moral rights for animals.36 
There are three specific fundamental obstacles that preclude 
successful advocacy through legal means.37 First, although there are 
laws in the United States aimed at regulating animal usage, they 
rarely go beyond prescribing minimal guidelines to ensure that 
animals are used efficiently.38 Because animals are considered 
private property, their interests are always secondary to those of 
their owners.39 Second, despite the weakness of animal protection 
laws, many activists attempt to use these laws to effect change.40 
However, legal advocacy is rarely successful in obtaining 
protection for animals because activists typically lack legal 
standing to litigate the specific instances of cruelty that fall within 
the purview of the legislation.41 Finally, and perhaps most 
                                                           
34 See Pattrice Jones, Mothers with Monkeywrenches: Feminist Imperatives 
and the ALF, in TERRORISTS OR FREEDOM FIGHTERS 137, 137–38 (Steven Best 
& Anthony J. Nocella II eds., 2004). 
35 Laura G. Kniaz, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the 
Underground Railroad, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 781 (1995). 
36 Id. at 796. 
37 Id. at 781. 
38 YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG, supra note 4, at 10. 
39 See id. at 10. 
40 Kniaz, supra note 35, at 794. 
41 Standing is a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial 
enforcement of a duty or right. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). For 
examples of cases where the lack of standing has been a procedural bar to 
bringing claims for violations of animal protection legislation, see, e.g., 
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (In declining to 
grant the cetaceans standing to bring suit in their own name under the 
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importantly, “animal enterprises wield extraordinary cultural and 
political power in the United States.”42 Enormous transnational 
industries are involved in raising and killing billions of animals for 
food, clothing, product testing, biomedical research, and 
entertainment each year.43 Today, products that result from animal 
exploitation are so abundant that it is nearly impossible to live 
without supporting the abuse of animals in some fashion, whether 
directly or indirectly.44 
As a result of the limitations of legal activism for animals, illegal 
direct action is sometimes perceived as the most effective method 
of animal rights advocacy. The Animal Liberation Front (“ALF”), a 
decentralized conglomerate of small autonomous groups, is among 
the most notorious for employing illegal direct action as its primary 
method of abolishing the property status of animals.45 Any 
individual may regard him/herself as part of the ALF so long as 
he/she carries out his/her actions in accordance with ALF 
guidelines: 
1. TO liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e. 
laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc, and place them in 
good homes where they may live out their natural lives, free 
                                                           
Endangered Species Act, the court stated that “[i]f Congress and the President 
intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well as people 
and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly.”) 
(quoting Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. The New 
England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993)); Animal Legal Def. 
Fund v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (animal welfare 
organization denied standing to bring action against the United States 
Department of Agriculture, challenging regulations promulgated under Animal 
Welfare Act); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (third parties do not have standing to challenge a rule indicating that 
genetically engineered animals are patentable subject matter). 
42 Kniaz, supra note 35, at 781. 
43 See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
44 Wise, supra note 5, at 20. 
45 See Addressing the Threat of Animal Rights Extremism and Eco-
Terrorism: Hearing Before the S.Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 109th 
Cong. (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Hearing] (testimony of John E. Lewis, Deputy 
Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism Div., FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ 
congress/congress05/lewis051805.htm (declaring the ALF “[o]ne of today’s 
most serious domestic terrorism threats”). 
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from suffering. 
2. TO inflict economic damage to those who profit from the 
misery and exploitation of animals. 
3. TO reveal the horror and atrocities committed against 
animals behind locked doors, by performing non-violent 
direct actions and liberations. 
4. TO take all necessary precautions against harming any 
animal, human and non-human. 
5. TO analyze the ramifications of all proposed actions, and 
never apply generalizations when specific information is 
available.46 
The ALF’s short-term goal is “to save as many animals as 
possible and directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse,” while 
their long term intention is to end all animal suffering by making it 
unprofitable for companies engaging in animal abuse to remain in 
business.47 ALF activists often force entry into animal enterprise 
facilities that confine animals in order to release48 or rescue them.49 
They typically operate at night, wearing balaclavas and in small 
groups of people.50 After removing animals from these facilities, 
ALF activists seize or destroy equipment and other property that 
has been used to exploit animals, and they sometimes use arson to 
destroy buildings and laboratories.51 “They have cost the animal 
exploitation industries hundreds of millions of dollars. They 
willfully break the law, because the law wrongly consigns animals 
to cages and confinement, to loneliness and pain, to torture and 
death.” 52 
 
                                                           
46 Animal Liberation Front, supra note 8. 
47 Id. 
48 Mink or coyotes are released from confinement and left to acclimate to the 
wild. Best & Nocella, supra note 31, at 11. 
49 Cats, dogs, mice, and guinea pigs are not merely released, but rescued 
and taken with activists. Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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II.   ACTIVISTS AS “TERRORISTS” 
[M]ost Americans would not consider the harassment of 
animal testing facilities to be “terrorism,” any more than 
they would consider anti-globalization protestors or anti-
war protestors or women’s health activists to be 
terrorists.53 
 - Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) 
 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) has branded direct 
action by animal and environmental activists “eco-terrorism.”54 It 
defines eco-terrorism as “the use or threatened use of violence of a 
criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an 
environmentally-oriented, subnational group for environmental-
political reasons . . . .”55 This characterization of violence is 
troublesome because the government, motivated by politics and the 
ideological biases of lawmakers, has singled out property crimes 
committed by these activists.56 The fundamental disparity between 
standard criminal behavior and direct action on behalf of animals or 
the environment is that the latter is adverse to corporate interests 
                                                           
53 Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality: Hearing Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hearing] (statement of 
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Vt.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_ 
statement.cfm?id=1196&wit_id=2629. 
54 Henry Schuster, Domestic Terror: Who’s Most Dangerous?, CNN, Aug. 
14, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/08/24/schuster.column/index.html. 
55 The Threat of Eco-Terrorism: Hearing Before the H. Res. Subcomm. on 
Forests and Forest Health, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Hearing] 
(testimony of James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Sec. Chief, FBI), available 
at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm. 
56 See, e.g., ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE 5 
(2004). 
Almost all the top positions at the agencies that protect our 
environment and oversee our resources have been filled by former 
lobbyists for the biggest polluters in the very businesses that these 
ministries oversee. These men and women seem to have entered 
government service with the express purpose of subverting the agencies 
they now command. 
Id. 
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and consequently threatens the political status quo.57 
In 2005, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee 
met to discuss the alleged threat posed by these “eco-terrorists,” as 
well as the measures the federal government is taking to “detect, 
disrupt, and dismantle the animal rights and environmental 
extremist movements.”58 Addressing the committee, FBI Deputy 
Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division John E. Lewis 
declared that “[o]ne of today’s most serious domestic terrorism 
threats come from special interest extremist movements such as the 
Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), 
and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) campaign.”59 In 
fact, Lewis has stated that “[t]he No. 1 domestic terrorism threat is 
the eco-terrorism, animal-rights movement.”60 Contrary to what 
these remarks may suggest, however, the ALF, which is generally 
cited as the archetype of eco-terrorism, explicitly denounces 
violence against both human and nonhuman animals.61 
In light of the FBI’s classification of animal rights activists as 
the nation’s top priority of domestic terrorism, “Americans should 
question whether the Justice Department is making America’s far-
                                                           
57 Industry lobbying to Congress and federal agencies has undoubtedly 
played a significant part in the classification of direct action as “terrorism.” For 
example, the American Medical Association and the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of Americatwo representatives of the pharmaceutical 
industry and its unwavering commitment to animal experimentationrank 
among the top five spenders in the country in governmental lobbying. 
Combined, they have spent almost $300,000,000 between 1998 and 2007. 
Opensecrets.org, Lobbying Spending Database, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
lobbyists/index. asp?txtindextype=s (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
58 2005 Hearing, supra note 45 (testimony of John E. Lewis, Deputy 
Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism Div., FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ 
congress/congress05/lewis051805.htm. 
59 Id. 
60 Schuster, supra note 54 (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that Lewis 
and other governmental agents consistently refer to these activist organizations 
as “eco-terrorists” and “violent,” while failing to mention that “not a single 
incident of so-called [eco-terrorism] has killed anyone.” Steven Best, Showtrials 
and Scarecrows: “Ecoterrorism” and the War on Dissent, IMPACT PRESS, 
Summer 2005, http://www.impactpress.com/articles/summer05/bestsummer05. 
html (quoting Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ)). 
61 Animal Liberation Front, supra note 8. 
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right fanatics a serious priority.”62 For example, on an internal list 
of threats to the nation’s security, the Department of Homeland 
Security does not list anti-government groups, white supremacists 
and other radical movements that have staged various terrorist 
attacks and have killed hundreds of Americans.63 Criticizing the 
politically charged use of terrorist discourse, the Southern Poverty 
Law Center has pointed out that “for all the property damage they 
have wreaked, eco-radicals have killed no one—something that 
cannot be said of the white supremacists and others who people 
the American radical right.”64 Between 1995 and 2005, white 
supremacist and other extremist groups produced 60 terrorist 
plots, including plans to bomb or burn government buildings, 
abortion clinics, places of worship, and bridges; assassinate police 
officers, judges, politicians, civil rights figures and abortion 
providers; and stockpile illegal machine guns, missiles, explosives, 
and biological and chemical weapons.65 
Given the demonstrated violent propensities of many of the 
country’s extremist groups and the government’s subsequent focus 
on animal and environmental rights activists, it is evident that the 
priorities of federal law enforcement have become misplaced. After 
168 individuals were killed and over 800 injured in the Oklahoma 
City attack by anti-government militia sympathizers Timothy 
McVeigh and Terry Nichols, a Justice Department official stated, 
                                                           
62 Daniel Levitas, Our Enemies at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2003, at 
A19. 
63 Justin Rood, Animal Rights Groups and Ecology Militants Make DHS 
Terrorist List, Right-Wing Vigilantes Omitted (Mar. 25, 2005), 
http://www.cq.com/public/20050325_homeland.html. 
64 Southern Poverty Law Center, Decade of domestic terror documented by 
Center (Sept. 2005), http://www.splcenter.org/center/splcreport/article.jsp?aid= 
164. 
65 Andrew Blejwas et al., Southern Poverty Law Center, Terror From the 
Right, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Summer 2005, http://www.splcenter.org/intel/ 
intelreport/article.jsp?aid=549. Since 1993, anti-abortion extremists alone have 
murdered seven abortion providers, attempted fifteen murders, mailed 656 
anthrax threats, and engaged in hundreds of other instances of physical violence. 
National Abortion Federation, Violence and Disruption Statistics (Aug. 31, 
2007), http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_ 
abortion/violence_statistics.pdf. 
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“Unfortunately, keeping track of right-wing and neo-Nazi hate 
groups isn’t necessarily a path to career advancement in the 
Bureau.”66 Under pressure from the White House and conservative 
Republicans, national security organizations have made the 
troubling political decision to discount the life-threatening violence 
emanating from Americans on the far-right fringe, and instead focus 
on nonviolent activist groups.67 
 
III.   “ECO-TERRORISM” LEGISLATION AND ITS APPLICATION 
A.   The Animal Enterprise Protection Act 
As a response to the increase in effective direct action activism, 
Congress enacted the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 
(“AEPA”).68 This legislation, shepherded by the National 
Association for Biomedical Research,69 created the crime of “animal 
enterprise terrorism.”70 In doing so, it amended federal criminal law 
to provide a fine, up to one year in prison, or both, for anyone who 
intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning 
of an animal enterprise by intentionally stealing, damaging, 
or causing the loss of, any property (including animals or 
records) used by the animal enterprise, and thereby causes 
economic damage exceeding $10,000 to that enterprise, or 
conspires to do so.”71 
The AEPA also provided for increased imprisonment penalties of 
                                                           
66 Levitas, supra note 62 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67 Schuster, supra note 54. 
68 Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 (West 
2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006). 
69 Steven Best, New, Improved, and ACLU Approved, 
http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/AgainstALF/AETANew.htm 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2008). 
70 Marjorie A. Berger, ed., 2006 Legislative Review, 13 ANIMAL L. 299, 
301 (2007). 
71 Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 (West 
2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006). 
  
 “ECO-TERRORISM” LEGISLATION 837 
up to ten years if a violation results in serious bodily injury to an 
individual and life in prison if a violation results in death.72 
 The AEPA was not used until September 16, 1998, when a 
federal grand jury in Wisconsin indicted activists Peter Young and 
Justin Samuel for, inter alia, animal enterprise terrorism.73 The 
indictment alleged their connection to a raid of fur farms in the 
Midwest in October 1997, in which an estimated 8,000 to 12,000 
mink were released from five mink farms over a two week period.74 
In 2000, after Samuel was apprehended in Belgium and 
subsequently extradited to the United States, he entered a plea 
agreement with federal prosecutors to implicate Young in exchange 
for a lighter sentence.75 Samuel pled guilty to two misdemeanor 
offenses under the AEPA,76 and was sentenced to two years in 
prison and ordered to pay over $360,000 in fines.77 
On March 31, 2005, Young was arrested after seven years of 
FBI pursuit.78 After rejecting various plea deals in exchange for 
becoming an undercover agent in the animal rights movement or 
providing investigators with the names of other activists, the 
government dropped four of the felony counts and Young 
eventually pled guilty to the remaining animal enterprise terrorism 
                                                           
72 Id. 
73 2002 Hearing, supra note 55 (testimony of James F. Jarboe, Domestic 
Terrorism Sec. Chief, FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/ 
congress02/jarboe021202.htm. 
74 SupportPeter.com, Background Information, http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20070429230300/http://www.supportpeter.com/background.htm (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2008). Justin Samuel testified before a federal grand jury that he and 
Young cut the perimeter fence of the mink farm, entered the barn type structures 
in which the mink were kept, and opened the cages for the mink to escape. 
SupportPeter.com, Justin Samuel’s 2000 Grand Jury Transcripts, http://web. 
archive.org/web/20070103160201/http://supportpeter.com/jstestimony2.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
75 SupportPeter.com, Background Information, supra note 74. 
76 Kevin Murphy, Washington State Man Admits Releasing Hundreds of 
Minks by Cutting Fences, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 31, 2000, at B2. 
77 Will Potter, Animal Enterprise Protection Act, http://www. 
greenisthenewred.com/blog/aepa/ (July 29, 2006). 
78 SupportPeter.com, Background Information, supra note 74. 
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charges under the AEPA.79 He received a sentence of two years in 
federal prison, 360 hours of community service at a charity to 
benefit “humans and no other species,” $254,000 restitution, and 
one year probation.80 
Despite these sentences, industry groups pushed for 
expansions of “animal enterprise terrorism” legislation, alleging that 
the AEPA was an ineffective prosecutorial tool due to the limited 
penalties available for violations and its sparing application.81 In 
response to the heavy lobbying from animal-testing firms and 
pharmaceutical companies, Congress amended various provisions 
of the AEPA in 2002.82 
While opponents of animal enterprise terrorism legislation take 
little issue with Congress’ decision to increase the maximum prison 
sentence for causing serious bodily injury,83 the expansion of the 
scope of the statute and the increased penalties for nonviolent 
actions are much more controversial.84 This 2002 revision 
eliminated the requirement that economic damage to an animal 
enterprise must exceed $10,000, thereby providing a federal cause 
of action for even minimal economic loss.85 The newly created 
remedy for “economic damage,” defined as damage “not exceeding 
$10,000 to an animal enterprise,” consisted of a fine, maximum 
imprisonment of six months, or both.86 Further, “major economic 
damage,” defined as “economic damage exceeding $10,000 to an 
animal enterprise,” could result in a fine and imprisonment of up to 
three years, tripling the maximum sentence previously permitted 
                                                           
79 Id. 
80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 9 (“Penalties attached to crimes committed 
against businesses and laboratories are appropriate, by some minimal definition, 
and, simultaneously, they are glaringly ineffective. This paradox constitutes the 
most serious practical problem confronting the Act’s utility as either a deterrent 
to terrorism or a prosecutorial tool.”). 
82 The Public Heath Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–188, sec. 336, § 43(a) (2002) (amending the Animal 
Enterprise Protection Act of 1992). 
83 Pub. L. 107-188, sec. 336(b), § 43(b)(3) (2002). 
84 Id. § 43(b). 
85 Id. § 43(b)(1). 
86 Id. 
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under the Act.87 Lastly, this revision included a catch-all category 
for restitution, authorizing such an order “for any other economic 
damage resulting from the offense.”88 Thus, the legislation 
addressed the concerns of lobbyists, increasing scope of the Act 
and the penalties applicable to offenses that constitute “animal 
enterprise terrorism.” 
B.   The Case of the SHAC 7 
Since 1999, animal rights activists have waged an aggressive 
direct action campaign and utilized high-pressure tactics to 
advocate the closure of Huntingdon Life Sciences (“HLS”). HLS is 
a contract research laboratory89 with facilities in New Jersey and 
England that purportedly kills 180,000 animals per year to test 
pharmaceutical products, pesticides, industrial and other 
chemicals.90 This international campaign, known as Stop 
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (“SHAC”), has targeted HLS because 
five undercover investigations at the labs have revealed appalling 
                                                           
87 Id. § 43(b)(2). Prior to this amendment, the AEPA provided that an 
individual could be imprisoned for up to one year for economic damage 
exceeding $10,000. Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
43 (West 2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006). 
88 Pub. L. 107-188, sec. 336(c)(3), § 43(c) (2002). The previous text of the 
AEPA provided restitution only for: (1) “the reasonable cost of repeating any 
experimentation that was interrupted or invalidated as a result of the offense”; 
and (2) “the loss of food production or farm income reasonable attributable to 
the offense.” Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 (West 
2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006). 
89 A “[c]ontract research organization . . . assumes, as an independent 
contractor with the sponsor, one or more of the obligations of a sponsor, e.g., 
design of a protocol, selection or monitoring of investigations, evaluation of 
reports, and preparation of materials to be submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2008). Companies often outsource 
various forms of testing to contract research laboratories for products such as 
“pharmaceuticals, food additives and a variety of crop protection and consumer 
chemicals.” Huntingdon Life Sciences, Company Overview, http:// 
www.huntingdon.com/index.php?currentNumber=0&currentIsExpanded=0 (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
90 Barbara Stagno, Life Science or Living Hell?, SATYA, Nov./Dec. 2000, 
accessed at  http://www.satyamag.com/novdec00/stagno.html. 
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acts of animal cruelty and countless violations of the Animal 
Welfare Act.91 Video footage obtained during those investigations 
showed workers punching beagle puppies in the face, dissecting 
live monkeys and falsifying scientific data.92 
SHAC activists campaigning against HLS in the United States 
developed methodological approaches to activism that were new to 
the animal rights movement, as well as to social justice movements 
in general.93 They utilized direct action tactics, the internet, an 
understanding of the legal system, and a singular focus on 
eliminating HLS as a primary representative of the evils of the 
vivisection industry.94 These strategies resulted in the creation of 
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA (“SHAC USA”), an 
incorporated organization whose sole purpose was to provide 
information, distinct from the SHAC campaign in which activists 
participate in both legal and illegal forms of direct action.95 
Fundamentally, SHAC USA merely operated a website that 
provided information and ideological support for protest activity 
against HLS, and significantly, its business affiliates.96 “By 
maintaining [this] vital distinction . . . SHAC . . . pushed the 
political envelope as a movement while technically remaining 
within its rights as an organization.”97 
                                                           
91 For more information on HLS and a video that was filmed during one of 
the undercover investigations, see SHAC7.com, HLS & Vivisection, 
http://www.shac7.com/hls.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
92 Id. A recent lawsuit filed by a former HLS employee alleges that he was 
fired without explanation in 2005 after refusing “to change his interpretation of 
research data to show a test resulted in a success instead of the actual failure” so 
the company would be able to continue billing its clients for further unnecessary 
testing. Ken Serrano, Suit Cites False-Data Desires, Racial Bias at Lab, HOME 
NEWS TRIB., Nov. 4, 2007, http://www.thnt.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID= 
/20071104/NEWS/711040457/1001. 
93 See Steven Best and Richard Kahn, Trial By Fire: The SHAC7, 
Globalization, and the Future of Democracy, 2 ANIMAL LIBERATION PHIL. 
AND POL’Y J. 1, 1 (2004). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 18. 
96 SHAC7.com, The Case, http://www.shac7.com/case.htm (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2008). 
97 Best & Kahn, supra note 93, at 18. 
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However, on May 26, 2004, disregarding the distinction 
between SHAC USA and the SHAC direct action campaign, federal 
agents descended upon six animal rights activists involved with 
SHAC USA with guns drawn and helicopters over head.98 These 
activists, along with the SHAC USA organization, have come to be 
known as the SHAC 7.99 
The SHAC 7 were indicted by a New Jersey grand jury on 
federal charges alleging they had orchestrated an interstate 
campaign of terrorism and intimidation, amounting to a conspiracy 
to violate the AEPA.100 These charges were based solely on the 
existence of the SHAC USA website, which contained home 
addresses and other personal information about Huntingdon Life 
Sciences employees, associates, and their family members, as well 
as news and anonymous communiqués submitted by activists that 
did engage in direct action.101 However, the creators of the site and 
the organization did not advocate any particular direct action 
tactics or direct action in general.102 In fact, the bottom of each page 
on the website contained a disclaimer which read: “[SHAC USA 
does] not advocate any form of violent activity, and in fact . . . 
urge[s] people that when they write letters or they send emails, 
that they’re polite, they’re to the point, they’re not threatening in 
nature.”103 Instead, the website was meant to remind those who 
opposed the practices at HLS that the company’s employees and 
affiliates were supporting its existence, without which it could no 
longer operate.104 
                                                           
98 See id., at 1; Chris Maag, America’s #1 Threat, MOTHER JONES, Jan. 1, 
2006, at 18. 
99 The SHAC 7 consists of: Kevin Kjonaas, Lauren Gazzola, Jacob Conroy, 
Darius Fullmer, Andrew Stepanian, and Joshua Harper. John McGee, a seventh 
activist, was also charged originally but was later dropped from the case. 
SHAC7.com, The Case, supra note 96. 
100 Id. 
101 Telephone Interview by Amy Goodman of Democracy Now! with 
Andrew Stepanian, member of the SHAC 7, and Andrew Erba, a lead attorney in 
the SHAC 7 case (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Democracy Now! Interview], 
available at http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/10/03/142235. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
  
842 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
The activists denied any involvement with the vandalism, 
threats, and other forms of direct action that were subsequently 
carried out against Huntingdon Life Sciences employees and 
insisted they were “simply trying to shame their targets into 
dissociating themselves from the company . . . .”105 In fact, federal 
prosecutors failed to introduce any evidence that the individual 
defendants or the organization directly participated in any direct 
action.106 Instead, the government argued to jurors that the 
information contained on the SHAC USA website enabled activists 
to target those affiliated with the company and incited illegal direct 
action.107  
The government attempted to attribute to the SHAC 7 the 
violence that did occur as part of the campaign to close HLS.108 
Various government witnesses testified about the protest activity 
and criminal actions carried out against HLS, its employees, and its 
affiliates.109 However, the one significant commonality among the 
testimony of the government’s witnesses is that none were able to 
identify any of the defendants as activists who engaged in criminal 
acts against them.110 
Nonetheless, on March 2, 2006, after fourteen hours of 
deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.111 
All six defendants were found guilty of “[c]onspiracy to violate the 
Animal Enterprise Protection Act”112 and became the first 
                                                           
105 David Kocieniewski, Six Animal Rights Activists are Convicted of 
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at B3. 
106 Id. 
107 Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office—District of New Jersey, 
Militant Animal Rights Group, Six Members Convicted in Campaign to 
Terrorize Company, Employees and Others (Mar. 2, 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/shac0302_r.htm [hereinafter U.S. 
Attorney’s Press Release]. 
108 SHAC7.com, The Case, supra note 96. 
109 Id. Among the witnesses was HLS director Brian Cass, who resides in 
the United Kingdom. Id. Cass testified about the campaign against the company 
in England, an attack on him in England in 2001, and the alleged benefits that 
result from the animal research conducted by the company. Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Kocieniewski, supra note 105. 
112 U.S. Attorney Press Release, supra note 107. The six charges were as 
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individuals to be found guilty of animal enterprise terrorism.113 The 
activists were sentenced to between one and six years in federal 
prison, and the organization received five years probation and was 
ordered to pay a restitution of $1,000,001 to HLS, the 
responsibility of which belonged to the individual defendants.114 
C.   The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
The SHAC campaign was largely effective due to its innovative 
strategy of demonstrating against “tertiary” targets, such as the 
investors, insurers, and suppliers that support HLS and enable it to 
operate profitably but which cannot themselves be considered 
“animal enterprises.”115 Seemingly disregarding that the AEPA had 
been successfully used to prosecute individuals involved in this 
campaign that did not personally engage in direct action, animal 
industry groups once again pushed for broader legislation and 
greater maximum sentences than those available in the recently 
amended legislation.116 These efforts are illustrative of the driving 
force behind the enactment of animal enterprise legislation; that is, 
                                                           
follows: count one, conspiracy to violate the AEPA; count two, conspiracy to 
commit interstate stalking; counts three, four and five, interstate stalking of 
specific victims; and count six, conspiracy to use a telecommunications device 
to abuse, threaten and harass persons. Id. Kjonaas, Gazzola, and Conroy were 
found guilty of all counts, Harper of counts one and six, and Stepanian and 
Fuller only of conspiracy to violate the AEPA. Id. 
113 SHAC7.com, The Case, supra note 96. Until 2004, the AEPA had 
only been used to secure the guilty pleas of Peter Young and Justin Samuel, and 
no defendant charged with a violation had been to trial. See id. 
114 See Laura Mansnerus, Animal Rights Advocates Given Prison Terms, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at B8 (Judge Anne E. Thompson sentenced 
Kjonaas to six years, Gazzola to four years and four months, and Conroy to four 
years in prison); Trenton: Activist Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at 
B4 (Harper was sentenced to three years); Will Potter, Remaining SHAC 7 
Defendants Sentenced, http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/2006/09/19/ 
remaining-shac-7-defendants-sentenced/ (Sept. 19, 2006) (Stepanian was 
sentenced to three years and Fullmer to twelve months and one day). 
115 Best & Kahn, supra note 93, at 17. 
116 See, e.g., 2004 Hearing, supra note 53 (testimony of William Green, 
Senior V.P. and General Counsel, Chiron Corporation), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1196&wit_id=3462. 
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industry groups are not concerned with further criminalizing those 
acts that are already illegal for criminal justice purposes, but 
instead are urging the federal government to shield their corporate 
interests entirely from opposition.117 
On May 18, 2004, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held 
a hearing on “Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality,” where 
government officials, corporate executives and animal 
experimenters met to discuss the perceived need for stronger 
legislation.118 The proposed amendments included a provision to 
prohibit causing economic loss, even in the absence of any physical 
destruction; expanding the act to include tertiary targets; expanding 
the definition of “animal enterprise” to include the use of animals 
“for education . . . [and] for the purpose of advancing biomedical 
sciences;” and increasing the maximum prison sentence to ten years 
for physical or economic disruption.119 John E. Lewis, the FBI 
Deputy Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division, 
argued to the committee that these measures were necessary 
because “[w]hile it is a relatively simple matter” to prosecute 
activists who allegedly commit arson or use explosive devices 
under existing federal statutes, “it is often difficult if not 
impossible to address a campaign of low-level . . . criminal activity 
like that of SHAC in federal court.”120 
However, the indictment of the SHAC 7 just two days after 
this committee hearing, and their subsequent conviction, 
                                                           
117 William Green of Chiron Corp., a biotechnology company that had 
contracted with HLS to conduct primate and other animal testing, urged 
Congress to adopt further means by which to prosecute animal rights activists, 
because “[a]s the law presently stands, tools are insufficient.” Id. In support of 
this assertion, he noted that “Chiron Corporation and its employees have been 
the target of a . . . campaign by animal rights extremists” that has cost the 
company “significant time and resources to defend [itself]; resources that [it] 
believe[s] would have been better invested in [its] research efforts.” Id. 
118 2004 Hearing, supra note 53. 
119 Id. (testimony of William Green, Senior V.P. and General Counsel, 
Chiron Corporation), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony. 
cfm?id=1196&wit_id=3462. 
120 Id. (testimony of John E. Lewis, Deputy Assistant Dir., 
Counterterrorism Div., FBI), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony. 
cfm?id=1196&wit_id=3460. 
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demonstrates that the AEPA was sufficient to prosecute 
defendants. The legislation was interpreted so broadly as to 
encompass nonviolent actions that cannot be incorporated into any 
traditional framework of criminal activity.121 Therefore, the 
adoption of any amendments to expand the reach of and increase 
penalties under the AEPA was unnecessary, and the claim that 
existing federal legislation was insufficient to prosecute those who 
demonstrate against secondary targets was illogical. 
During the first session of the 109th Congress in 2005, Senator 
James Inhofe (R-Okla.) and Representative Thomas Petri (R-WI) 
introduced early versions of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act 
(“AETA”) as an amendment to the AEPA.122 This legislation, 
drafted with assistance from the Department of Justice and the 
FBI, was meant to “enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s response to recent trends in the animal 
rights terrorist movement.”123 The bill addressed the concerns being 
voiced by industry groups, incorporating provisions to enhance the 
protection of corporate interests.124 No action was taken on the bill 
during that session other than referral to committee.125 Inhofe and 
Petri introduced the final version of the bill to Congress in 2006.126 
Throughout this process, animal advocacy and civil rights 
organizations expressed their opposition to the AETA to the 
                                                           
121 See infra text accompanying notes 224–55 (concluding that the 
activities of the SHAC 7 were entitled to the protections of the First 
Amendment). 
122 Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment & Public 
Works, Inhofe Introduces Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (Oct. 28, 2005), 
http://epw.senate.gov/pressitem.cfm?party=rep&id=247941. 
123 Id. 
124 Incorporating the provisions recommended by industry groups expanded 
the scope and increased the penalties of animal enterprise terrorism legislation, 
providing greater protections to those encompassed by the Act. See infra text 
accompanying notes 141–51. “No other industrial sector in U.S. history has 
ever been given such legal protections against people’s exercising of their First 
Amendment free-speech rights.” PETA, Tell Congress That Exposing Animal 
Abuse Is Not Illegal!, http://www.peta.org/Automation/AlertItem.asp?id=2032 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
125 Berger, supra note 70, at 300. 
126 Id. at 300–01. 
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House Judiciary Committee.127 These organizations cautioned that 
the AETA’s characterization of the loss of property128 could 
potentially infringe upon constitutionally protected forms of 
activism such as demonstrations, leafleting, undercover 
investigations, and boycotts.129 They argued that the bill contained 
vague and overbroad language, and furthermore was unnecessary 
because federal criminal laws already provided sufficient 
punishments for unlawful activities by activists targeting animal 
enterprises.130 Consequently, they argued, the legislation would 
have had a “chilling” effect on free speech, as animal advocates 
would not be aware of what traditionally protected activities would 
fall within the purview of the AETA.131 
After the AETA passed in the Senate, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) changed its position on the legislation, 
stating in a letter to the House Judiciary Committee that it would 
not oppose the bill if minor but necessary changes were made to 
make it less likely to threaten free speech.132 Specifically, the 
ACLU stated that the bill should define “real or personal 
property” as “tangible” property to avoid penalizing legitimate and 
                                                           
127 See, e.g., Caroline Fredrickson and Lisa Graves, ACLU, An Open Letter 
to Congress (Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/gen/ 
25620leg20060306.html [hereinafter ACLU Open Letter]; National Lawyers 
Guild, National Lawyers Guild Opposes Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (Oct. 
30, 2006), http://www.nlg.org/news/statements/AETA_Act.htm [hereinafter 
National Lawyers Guild]; Humane Society of the United States, Oppose the 
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA), http://www.hsus.org/web-
files/PDF/109_AETA_factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2007) [hereinafter 
Humane Society]. 
128 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 133, 141–44. 
129 ACLU Open Letter, supra note 127; National Lawyers Guild, supra 
note 127; Humane Society, supra note 127. 
130 ACLU Open Letter, supra note 127; National Lawyers Guild, supra 
note 127; Humane Society, supra note 127. 
131 ACLU Open Letter, supra note 127; National Lawyers Guild, supra 
note 127; Humane Society, supra note 127. 
132 Letter from Caroline Fredrickson and Lisa Graves, ACLU, to James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr., House Judiciary Committee Chairman, and John Conyers, 
Jr., House Judiciary Committee (Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ACLU Letter to 
House], available at http://www.aclu.org/images/general/asset_upload_file809_ 
27356.pdf. 
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otherwise legal activity that results in lost profits.133 It further 
advocated for clarification that a provision, which imposes a 
penalty for actions that caused no reasonable fear of bodily harm, 
no actual bodily injury or no economic damage, applied only to 
conspiracies or attempts to violate the Act.134 These recommended 
changes were not made, however, thereby keeping many forms of 
previously accepted forms of activism within the purview of the 
bill.135 
Without further addressing these expressed concerns, on 
November 13, 2006, House Judiciary Committee Chairman James 
Sensenbrenner moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill.136 The 
motion to suspend the rules was granted and the bill passed by 
voice vote.137 With little or no dissent throughout these 
proceedings, the AETA was signed into law by President Bush on 
November 27, 2006.138 
The final version of the AETA addresses the concerns of the 
                                                           
133 Id. at 1–2 (The ACLU suggested that the bill specify that it “does not 
include damage or loss resulting from a boycott, protest, demonstration, 
investigation, whistleblowing, reporting of animal mistreatment, or any public, 
governmental, or business reaction to the disclosure of information concerning 
animal enterprises.”). 
134 Id. at 2–3. The ACLU stated that 
[s]ince reasonable fear of bodily harm, actual bodily injury or economic 
damages are all elements of crimes associated with more severe 
penalties under the bill, we assume the first penalty provision under the 
bill is meant to address conspiracies or attempts. However, this should 
be clarified [t]o avoid the chilling effect on those individuals 
considering actions that would cause no harm, either physical or 
economic, nor instill any fear of harm. . . . 
Id. 
135 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2006). 
136 Lib. Cong., THOMAS, Search Bill Summary and Status for the 109th 
Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/109search.html (search “Animal Enterprise 
Terrorism Act”, select “S. 3880”, select “All Information”) (last accessed Feb. 
21, 2008). Under this procedure, often used to act expeditiously on relatively 
non-controversial legislation, floor debate is limited and all floor amendments 
are prohibited. THOMAS P. CARR, SUSPENSION OF THE RULES IN THE HOUSE: 
PRINCIPAL FEATURES (2004), http://www.rules.house.gov/Archives/98-314.pdf. 
137 Lib. Cong., supra note 136. 
138 Id. 
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industry groups and lobbyists that pushed for its passage.139 It 
further expands the reach of federal animal enterprise legislation 
and increases its penalties beyond those imposed by the AEPA as 
amended in 2002.140 As a result, the legislation has become 
excessively broad and vague, creating a chilling effect on activists’ 
exercise of constitutionally-protected speech. 
1.  AETA: Offenses 
 Through a series of amendments, the AETA has significantly 
expanded the scope of “animal enterprise terrorism” beyond its 
applicability under the AEPA. First, while the AEPA required that 
an individual have the “purpose of causing physical disruption to 
the functioning of an animal enterprise” for conduct to constitute a 
violation, the AETA eliminates the previous limitation of physical 
disruption and proscribes all conduct engaged in “for the purpose 
of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal 
enterprise.”141 In addition, Congress has taken steps to increase the 
number of individuals and entities protected by the Act: the term 
“animal enterprise” has been broadly redefined to include 
essentially any industry or company that is involved in the 
exploitation of animals, either directly or indirectly;142 and 
“tertiary” targeting is included within its scope, expanding the 
protections of the legislation far beyond those that fall within the 
definition of an animal enterprise.143 
                                                           
139 See, e.g., 2004 Hearing, supra note 53 (testimony of William Green, 
Senior V.P. and General Counsel, Chiron Corporation), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1196&wit_id=3462. 
140 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 141–51. 
141 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2006) 
(emphasis added). 
142 Id. § 43(d)(1). The definition now encompasses: (1) commercial or 
academic enterprises that use or sell animals or animal products for profit, food 
or fiber production, agriculture, education, research, or testing; (2) zoos, 
aquariums, animal shelters, pet stores, breeders, furriers, circuses, or rodeos, or 
other lawful competitive animal events; and (3) any fair or similar event intended 
to advance agricultural arts and sciences. Id. 
143 Tertiary targets are defined as any “person or entity hav[ing] a 
connection to, relationship with, or transactions with an animal enterprise.” Id. 
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Finally, the AETA does not proscribe only physical or 
economic disruption, but further prohibits individuals from 
“intentionally plac[ing] a person in reasonable fear” of death or 
serious bodily injury to that person, a member of their immediate 
family, or their partner “by a course of conduct involving threats, 
acts of vandalism, property damage, criminal trespass, harassment, 
or intimidation.”144 In sum, the legislation now proscribes a broader 
range of conduct when directed at a larger class of persons. 
2.  AETA: Penalties and Restitution 
The AETA further increases the maximum penalties of the 
AEPA.145 Most significantly, the punishment for a violation of the 
Act, or attempt or conspiracy to violate the Act, is a fine, 
imprisonment up to one year, or both if the offense does not instill 
in another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death, 
results in no bodily injury, and causes no economic damage or 
economic damage not exceeding $10,000.146 In addition, a violation 
under the AETA will result in a fine or imprisonment for up to five 
years, or both, if no bodily injury occurs and the offense results in 
economic damage between the amounts of $10,000 and 
$100,000.147 
                                                           
§ 43(a)(2)(A). 
144 Id. § 43(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
145 Id. § 43(b)(1). 
146 Id. (“economic damage” is defined by § 43(d)(3) as “the replacement 
costs of lost or damaged property or records, the costs of repeating an interrupted 
or invalidated experiment, the loss of profits, or increased costs, including losses 
and increased costs resulting from threats, acts or [sic] vandalism, property 
damage, trespass, harassment, or intimidation taken against a person or entity 
on account of that person’s or entity’s connection to, relationship with, or 
transactions with the animal enterprise.”). The AEPA did not provide for any 
penalty in the absence of economic damage and created a maximum of six 
months imprisonment for causing damage not exceeding $10,000. Animal 
Enterprise Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(b)(1) (West 2008) (as amended in 
2002). 
147 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(b)(2) (2006). The 
AEPA previously provided for a maximum penalty of three years in prison for 
these violations, rather than five. Animal Enterprise Protection Act, 18 
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Furthermore, like the AEPA, restitution under the AETA may 
include costs for repeating any experimentation that was 
interrupted or invalidated as a result of the offense, as well as for 
the loss of food production or farm income.148 However, the third 
catch-all category for “any other economic damage resulting from 
the offense”149 now expressly includes any losses or costs caused 
by economic disruption.150 Thus, while the revisions to these 
sections have increased the penalties and restitution for conduct 
that constituted “animal enterprise terrorism” under the AEPA, the 
amended sections primarily address Congress’ subsequent concern 
with economic loss.151 
D.   The Applicability of Terrorism Sentencing Enhancements to 
“Animal Enterprise Terrorism” 
Another tool that the federal government has attempted to use 
to deter individuals from engaging in direct action is the “terrorism” 
sentencing enhancement in the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(the “Guidelines”).152 Section 3A1.4(a) of the Guidelines provides 
for significantly increased sentences if an offense was “a felony 
that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of 
terrorism.”153 If applied, the enhancement more than doubles the 
length of a sentence authorized by the initial sentencing guideline 
range.154 
                                                           
U.S.C.A. § 43(b)(2) (West 2008) (as amended in 2002). 
148 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(c)(1)–(2) (2006). 
149 Animal Enterprise Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(c)(3) (West 2008) 
(as amended in 2002); Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(c)(3) 
(2006). 
150 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(c)(3) (2006). 
151 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 115–50. 
152 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4. 
153 Id. A “federal crime of terrorism” is defined as an offense that “is 
calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or 
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct” and falls under one of the 
many categories enumerated by the statute. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5). 
154 United States v. Thurston, Nos. CR 06-60069-01-AA, CR 06-60070-
01-AA, CR 06-60071-01-AA, CR 06-60078-01-AA, CR 06-60079-01-AA, CR 
06-60080-01-AA, CR 06-60120-01-AA, CR 06-60122-01-AA, CR 06-60122-
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In United States v. Thurston, an Oregon District Court ruled 
that terrorism enhancement penalties may apply to direct action by 
animal and environmental rights activists.155 However, while “the 
government retains the prosecutorial discretion to request the 
enhancement,”156 it will not be applied liberally.157 The court noted 
that because of the substantial increase that the enhancement may 
provide to a relatively short sentence, the government must meet a 
high burden of proof.158 That is, in order for the enhancement to 
apply, the government must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the offenses of conviction involved, or were intended 
to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.159 In addition, if “the 
government is overreaching due to political considerations, either 
the enhancement will not apply to defendants’ offenses or 
defendants will be eligible for a downward departure because their 
conduct is outside the ‘heartland’ of terrorism offenses.”160 
Perhaps the greatest protection that animal rights activists have 
from this enhancement being applied to instances of direct action is 
                                                           
02-AA, CR 06-60123-01-AA, CR 06-60124-01-AA, CR 06-60125-01-AA, CR 
06-60126-01-AA, 2007 WL 1500176, at *19 (D. Or. May 21, 2007). 
155 Id. at *20. 
156 Id. at *18. 
157 See infra notes 157–62 and accompanying text. 
158 Thurston, 2007 WL 1500176, at *19. 
159 Id. at *1. 
160 Id. at *18. It is noteworthy that the Thurston court prefaced its decision 
by writing that it was not “appropriate for the court to speculate whether the 
government seeks to promote a particular political agenda or to punish a 
particular form of activism in requesting the terrorism enhancement.” Id. at *1. 
The court likely included this statement because the government appears to have 
sought these penalty enhancements not because of the defendants’ criminal 
conduct, but because of their political beliefs. While the FBI states that 
“[t]errorism is terrorism—no matter what the motive,” Robert S. Mueller, FBI 
Director, Remarks at the Operation Backfire Press Conference (Jan. 20, 2006), 
accessed at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller012006.htm, it hasn’t 
sought “terrorism enhancement” for church arsons or the murders of abortion 
providers. Will Potter, Government Seeks “Terrorism Enhancement” for 
Environmental Activists, http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/2007/05/11/ 
terrorism-enhancement-hearing/ (May 11, 2007). In fact, “the enhancement has 
not [even] been sought . . . in prosecutions of persons who possessed biological 
toxins.” Thurston, 2007 WL 1500176, at *18. 
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that the federal crime of terrorism requires that actions be 
calculated “‘to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct.’ Thus, the government must establish that the defendants 
targeted government conduct rather than the conduct of private 
individuals or corporations.”161 Animal rights activists that use 
direct action tactics, such as the SHAC 7, target solely 
corporations and their affiliates that engage in the institutionalized 
exploitation of nonhuman animals in an attempt to make it 
unprofitable or inconvenient for the businesses to continue their 
practices; they do not target government entities or engage in home 
demonstrations of governmental employees.162 In fact, the term 
“direct action” refers to the fact that activists target the source of 
their concerns directly, rather than attempting to affect change 
indirectly through governmental means.163 Accordingly, although 
terrorism sentencing enhancements may be applicable to 
defendants convicted of “eco-terrorism” offenses,164 federal 
prosecutors face several obstacles in meeting their relatively high 
burden of proof. 
                                                           
161 Thurston, 2007 WL 1500176, at *15 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
2332b(g)(5)(A)). 
162 See, e.g., Potter supra note 160 (Illegal direction action is not “meant 
to influence government, because the [activists have] lost all faith that 
government could be influenced.”). 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 32–52. 
164 Thurston, 2007 WL 1500176, at *1. 
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IV.   FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will 
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance 
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the 
Government itself or a private licensee.165 
- Hon. Byron Raymond White 
A.   Boundaries of the Protections of Free Speech 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”166 However, the 
protection afforded by the First Amendment is not absolute and 
may be regulated when speech is “of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”167 
Two such narrowly tailored exceptions that the Supreme Court has 
explicitly recognized are where speech constitutes a “true 
threat,”168 or where it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”169 In 
addition, lower courts have, on occasion, determined that crime-
facilitating speech is not protected by the First Amendment.170  
                                                           
165 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 
(1969). 
166 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. 
167 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
168 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Virginia v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
169 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
170 See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, a 130 page book 
of detailed factual instructions on how to murder and to become a professional 
killer, was not entitled to protection under the First Amendment). 
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1.  True Threats: The Requirement of Subjective Intent 
The First Amendment does not exclude all potentially 
threatening speech from its protections.171 Instead, in Virginia v. 
Black,172 the Supreme Court held that only “true threats” may be 
banned under the First Amendment.173 “‘True threats’ encompass 
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”174 The 
Court further noted that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally 
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a 
speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the 
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”175 
While it is not required that the speaker subjectively intends to 
carry out the threatened action for the speech to be punishable,176 
the Court adopted a separate standard of subjective intent—it must 
be shown that the speaker intentionally threatened the individual or 
group of individuals.177 This prohibition is not merely intended to 
                                                           
171 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 706–07 (holding that defendant’s statement, 
“[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
[the president,]” was not a true threat but was constitutionally protected speech). 
The First Amendment protects “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks” as well as speech that is “vituperative, abusive, and inexact.” Id. 
at 708. 
172 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
173 Id. at 359. 
174 Id. 
175 Id.at 360. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 359. “The [Black] Court’s insistence on intent to threaten as the 
sine qua non of a constitutionally punishable threat is especially clear from its 
ultimate holding that the [state] statute was unconstitutional precisely because 
the element of intent was effectively eliminated . . . .” United States v. Cassel, 
408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005). Several circuit courts have modified their 
analysis of true threats to require this specific intent to threaten. See, e.g., id. 
(“[Black] embraces not only the requirement that the communication itself be 
intentional, but also the requirement that the speaker intend for his language to 
threaten the victim.”); United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (“Unprotected by the Constitution are threats that communicate the 
speaker’s intent to commit an act of unlawful violence against identifiable 
  
 “ECO-TERRORISM” LEGISLATION 855 
protect individuals from the possibility that the threatened violence 
will transpire, but also from the fear of violence and “disruption 
that fear engenders.”178 Thus, society’s interest in protecting 
threatening speech is secondary to that of maintaining a system of 
order and civility.179  
2.  Incitement: Advocacy of Unlawful Action and the Requirement of 
Imminence 
In the absence of a “true threat,” determining whether advocacy 
of violence or lawless action falls outside the purview of the 
protections of the First Amendment becomes even more complex. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that advocacy is 
constitutionally protected if it is not directed or likely to incite 
imminent illegal acts,180 the Court has not offered significant 
guidance on the meaning of “imminent.”181 Recent cases, however, 
suggest that this standard is difficult to meet if illegal acts do not 
immediately follow the speech in question.182 
Supreme Court opinions of the early twentieth century held 
that a State may reasonably and constitutionally conclude that 
certain instances of advocacy create such a danger to the public 
peace and security that they should be penalized by the use of 
State police power.183 However, in many of those cases, Justices 
                                                           
individuals.”); Vives v. City of New York, 405 F.3d 115, 123–24 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
178 Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 388 (1992)). 
179 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
180 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
181 Joanne Kirchner, Threatening Abortion Providers, Inciting Violence, or 
Exercising First Amendment Rights? Chapter 486 Takes a Precarious Stand, 
38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 159, 171 (2007). 
182 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v. 
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). 
183 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (affirming the 
conviction of Anita Whitney, found guilty of violating the California Criminal 
Syndicalism Act for her role as an organizing member of the Communist Labor 
Party); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the Espionage Act, the Court upheld the 
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Holmes and Brandeis dissented from the reasoning of the 
majority,184 defending the freedom of speech, stressing the 
distinction between advocacy and incitement, and supporting a 
requirement of a showing of “clear and present danger.”185 Thus, 
they advocated that for speech to no longer be protected, “it must 
be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected 
or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to 
believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.”186 
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Warren Court 
rejected previous restrictions on the exercise of free speech, and 
gradually adopted the Holmes-Brandeis requirement of the 
expectation of immediate violence.187 In 1969, this rationale was 
adopted in Brandenberg v. Ohio,188 and the reasoning of prior 
cases was expressly overruled.189 
After accepting an invitation from Brandenberg, the leader of a 
Ku Klux Klan group, a reporter and cameraman from a local 
television station attended a Ku Klux Klan gathering and filmed the 
events.190 On the basis of this gathering, Brandenberg was 
                                                           
conviction of defendant for printing materials intended to incite and advocate 
resistance to the United States in the war with Germany). 
184 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J. concurring); Abrams, 250 
U.S. at 624 (1919) (Holmes, J. in dissent). 
185 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376. 
186 Id. (emphasis added). Justice Brandeis further explained that “no danger 
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the 
evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for 
full discussion. If there be time [for discussion], the remedy to be applied is 
more speech, not enforced silence.” Id. at 377. 
187 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 n.5 (1951) 
(listing nine opinions that “have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis 
rationale”); American Communications Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 
412 (1950) (The First Amendment “requires that one be permitted to advocate 
what he will unless there is a clear and present danger that a substantial public 
evil will result.”). 
188 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
189 Id. at 449. 
190 Id. at 445. The film revealed twelve hooded figures, some of whom were 
armed, gathered around a large wooden cross which they eventually burned. Id. 
Portions of the film were later shown both on local and national television 
networks. Id. While most of the dialogue in the scene was unintelligible in the 
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convicted of violating an Ohio statute prohibiting the advocacy of 
unlawful acts “as a means of accomplishing industrial or political 
reform.”191 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding 
that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments because it failed to distinguish mere 
advocacy “from incitement to imminent lawless action.”192 Thus, 
even advocacy of the use of force or to violate the law are 
protected from State prohibition by the constitutional guarantees 
of free speech and press, so long as that advocacy is not directed or 
likely to incite or produce imminent illegal acts.193 
The Court has yet to expressly provide a clearly defined rule 
for determining when advocacy incites violence and thus may be 
prohibited by the First Amendment.194 However, two recent cases 
involving the incitement requirement have found that the harm 
threatened by the defendant’s speech was not sufficiently 
imminent for the speech to be to be proscribed.195 In the first case, 
Hess v. Indiana,196 approximately one hundred protestors moved 
onto a public street and blocked vehicle traffic during an anti-war 
demonstration.197 When police caused the demonstrators to 
                                                           
film, scattered phrases could be understood, such as “bury the niggers” and “we 
intend to do our part.” Id. at 446 n.1. 
191 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45. Brandenberg was charged with 
violating an Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
2923.13 (West 2008), for “advocating the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, 
sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing industrial or political reform” and for “voluntarily assembling 
with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate 
the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Upon 
conviction, he was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to ten years’ 
imprisonment. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45. 
192 Id. at 448–49. 
193 Id. at 447. 
194 See Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of 
the First Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1175, 1214 (2000). 
195 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v. 
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). 
196 414 U.S. 105. 
197 Id. at 106. 
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disperse,198 Hess said loudly, “[w]e’ll take the fucking street later 
(or again).”199 The Supreme Court concluded that this statement 
was not intended to incite further lawless action on the part of the 
crowd in the vicinity of Hess, nor likely to produce such action.200 
The opinion noted, “[a]t best . . . the statement could be taken as 
counsel for present moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing 
more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future 
time.”201 Thus, the Court held that these actions were not sufficient 
to permit the State to punish Hess for his speech.202 
In the second case, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,203 
white business owners who had suffered lost earnings as result of 
civil rights boycotts brought actions against the participants and 
civil rights organizations.204 In a series of speeches, NAACP 
chapter leader Charles Evers stated that boycott violators “would 
be watched”205 and “disciplined” by their own people.206 
Subsequently, those individuals were unlawfully disciplined.207 
Conceding that “[i]n the passionate atmosphere in which the 
speeches were delivered, they might have been understood as 
inviting an unlawful form of discipline or, at least, as intending to 
create a fear of violence,” the Court held that “[t]he emotionally 
                                                           
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 109. 
201 Id. at 108. 
202 Hess, 414 U.S. at 108. 
203 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
204 Id. at 889–90. 
205 Id. at 900 n.28. 
206 Id. at 902. Evers further warned violators that the Sheriff could not sleep 
with them at night and that if any African-American was caught “in any of them 
racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.” Id. The names of those who 
violated the boycott were then read at meetings of the local chapter of the 
NAACP and were published in a paper entitled the “Black Times.” Id. at 903–
04. 
207 Evidence adduced at trial illustrated that shots were fired at the homes of 
three violators, Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 904–05, a brick was thrown through the 
windshield of a car, id. at 904, a flower garden was intentionally damaged, id. at 
904, automobile tires were slashed, id. at 906, and two individuals were 
physically attacked, id. at 905. 
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charged rhetoric of Charles Evers’ speeches did not transcend the 
bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg.”208 Essential 
to this determination was that the violence allegedly caused by 
Evers’s rhetoric occurred weeks and months after his speeches 
were made.209 
In light of Brandenberg and its progeny, the Court has 
interpreted the First Amendment broadly and set forth expansive 
protections of advocacy speech.210 The resulting standard of 
imminence is a narrow one: “speech intended to stir anger and even 
speech that creates a climate of violence is protected under the 
First Amendment.”211 Thus, statements which advocate illegal 
action at some indefinite point in the future are insufficient to 
permit State proscription of speech.212 This stringent standard for 
imminence is particularly significant given the widespread 
knowledge of contemporary technology and the increasing use of 
the internet as a tool to express dissatisfaction with societal norms 
and disseminate related information.213  
                                                           
208 Id. at 927–28. 
209 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928. 
210 See Vitiello, supra note 194, at 1216–17. 
First, when speech values are at stake, a court has a heightened duty to 
review the record independently to determine whether the findings 
below are justified. Second, the Court will not lightly find that 
threatened harm is imminent, at least not absent a showing that the 
threatened harm has come shortly after the speech. Third, a state must 
prove the speaker’s intent to bring about the harm; the Court will read 
ambiguous evidence of the speaker’s intent in favor of the speaker. The 
Court requires intent, not mere knowledge, that the harm will occur. 
Id. 
211 Jason Schlosberg, Judgment on “Nuremberg”: An Analysis of Free 
Speech and Anti-Abortion Threats Made on the Internet, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 52, 74 (2001) (citing Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 926-32). 
212 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam). 
213 See e.g., The Final Nail, http://www.finalnail.com/ (last visited Feb. 
21, 2008) (providing address and contact information for laboratory animal 
suppliers, fur farms, slaughterhouses and companies that trap animals for fur); 
Close HLS, http://www.closehls.net/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (posting 
reports of demonstrations and providing addresses and contact information for 
HLS customers, lab suppliers, and financial affiliates); SHAC, http://www. 
shac.net/HLS/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (posting detailed 
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3.  Crime-Facilitating Speech 
“Crime-facilitating speech” is another area in which courts have 
been willing to restrict the exercise of free speech.214 This term 
refers to any communication that, intentionally or not, conveys 
information that makes it easier or safer for some listeners or 
readers to commit unlawful acts or to get away with committing 
them.215 The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly determine when 
such speech is constitutionally protected,216 and lower courts have 
not set forth any discernible rule in their unpredictable decisions.217 
Crime-facilitating speech is often a form of “dual-use” material 
that can be used both in harmful ways and in legitimate ones.218 
Thus, when attempting to generate a rule to regulate such speech, it 
is important that only the harmful uses are proscribed.219 Noting 
that “[m]uch crime-facilitating speech can educate readers, or give 
them practical information that they can use lawfully[,]” Professor 
                                                           
information compiled from the undercover investigations in HLS laboratories 
and a listing of HLS clients). While much of this information was also 
contained on the SHAC USA website, the primary distinction is that these 
websites do not post anonymous communiqués of illegal direct action and less, 
if any, personal information of company officials. 
214 Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 
(2005); see, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a book of instructions on how to become a professional killer was 
not entitled to First Amendment protection); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 
835 (9th Cir. 1982) (the publication and wide distribution of instructions on 
how to make illegal drugs is not entitled to protection of the First Amendment). 
215 Volokh, supra note 214, at 1103. 
216 Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (Stevens, J., respecting 
the denial of certiorari) (“Our cases have not yet considered whether, and if so to 
what extent, the First Amendment protects such instructional speech.”). 
217 Compare United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804 (8th Cir. 2000) (a 
permanent injunction prohibiting the sale of a program that provided 
instructions for avoiding federal income taxation did not violate promoters’ First 
Amendment right to free speech), with McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 631 
(9th Cir. 2002) (advising street gang members with a “blueprint on how a 
successful gang should be run” is protected by the First Amendment), cert. 
denied Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993 (2002). 
218 Volokh, supra note 214, at 1126–27. 
219 Id. at 1127. 
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Eugene Volokh, Professor of Law at UCLA Law School and the 
author of The First Amendment and Related Statutes,220 has set 
forth a balancing test, advocating that there should be an exception 
to First Amendment protections where at least one of the following 
three circumstances is present: 
1. When the speech is said to a few people who the speaker 
knows are likely to use it to commit a crime or to escape 
punishment (classic aiding and abetting, criminal facilitation, 
or obstruction of justice): This speech, unlike speech that’s 
broadly published, is unlikely to have noncriminal value to 
its listeners. It’s thus harmful, [and] it lacks First 
Amendment value. . . . 
2. When the speech, even though broadly published, has 
virtually no noncriminal uses . . . . This speech is likewise 
harmful and lacks First Amendment value. . . 
3. When the speech facilitates extraordinarily serious harms, 
such as nuclear or biological attacks: This speech is so 
harmful that it ought to be restricted even though it may 
have First Amendment value.221 
These narrow exceptions balance the significant values of 
protecting the right of free speech and prohibiting “speech that 
substantially facilitates crime.”222  
B.   Free Speech, the Internet, and the SHAC 7 
The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to 
punish the person engaging in it. It would be remarkable to 
hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information 
can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-
abiding third party.223 
- Hon. John Paul Stevens 
                                                           
220 EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 
(2005). 
221 Volokh, supra note 214, at 1217. 
222 Id. at 1111, 1217. 
223 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529–30 (2001). 
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 A law is “unconstitutionally broad [if] it authorizes the 
punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.”224 Accordingly, 
the most problematic aspect of the SHAC 7 convictions concerns 
the defendants’ rights to freedom of speech and association.225 It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the convictions of the 
SHAC 7 with the protections of the First Amendment. United 
States Attorney Christopher Christie stated in an interview that 
the defendants were “exhorting and encouraging” actions not 
protected by free speech guarantees.226 However, upon application 
of the First Amendment jurisprudence standards set forth above to 
the content of the SHAC USA website, the defendants do not 
appear to have engaged in any conduct that falls outside the 
purview of First Amendment protections.  
1.  True Threat 
The information posted on the SHAC USA website did not 
constitute a “true threat,” as it did not “communicate a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals.”227 At trial, an HLS 
employee who visited the SHAC USA website as part of his 
employment with the company recited postings from the site 
reporting on nation-wide protests and illegal actions by unknown 
individuals against HLS and its affiliates.228 Significantly, the pages 
that reported these events also contained a disclaimer, stating that 
the group did not direct, control or participate in the protests.229 
                                                           
224 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). 
225 Best & Kahn, supra note 93, at 19. 
226 Michael Taylor & Jim Herron Zamora, Stalking Charges Against 
Animal Rights Activists, S.F. CHRON., May 27, 2004, at A5. 
227 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
228 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 17, United States v. Kevin Kjonaas, No. 
06-4339 (3d Cir. filed Oct. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Kjonaas Brief]. 
229 Id.; United States v. Carmichael, 326 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1281 (M.D. 
Ala. 2004) (in holding that the First Amendment rights of the defendant 
precluded the court from ordering him to take down a website containing the 
pictures and personal information of government agents and informants, the court 
noted that a disclaimer of intent is evidence that the website would not 
reasonably be threatening to those individuals). 
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The same employee testified that he viewed the posting of “Top 
20 Terror Tactics.”230 However, this document was not written by 
anyone affiliated with SHAC USA; rather, it was re-posted from 
the website of an organization that compiled the list to garner 
support against the SHAC campaign.231 In fact, the heading of that 
page clearly stated that the list was taken from another source, and 
it contained a disclaimer “making it clear that SHAC did not 
organize or take part in any criminal activity.”232 Neither these 
postings nor the remainder of the information contained on the 
website communicated a subjective intent to commit violent acts 
against anyone affiliated with HLS.233 
                                                           
230 Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 16. To view SHAC USA’s posting of 
these nineteen tactics, visit: http://web.archive.org/web/20010502223703/http: 
//www.shacusa.net/news/3-6-01.html. The government contended that this 
document implicitly encouraged the invading of offices, vandalizing property and 
stealing documents; physical assault, including spraying cleaning fluid into 
someone’s eyes; smashing windows of a target’s home or flooding the home 
while the individual was away; vandalizing or firebombing cars and bomb 
hoaxes; and threatening telephone calls or letters, including threats to kill or 
injure someone’s partner or children. Press Release, United States Attorney’s 
Office–District of New Jersey, Three Militant Animal Rights Activists 
Sentenced to Between Four and Six Years in Prison 4 (Sept. 12, 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/ shac0912rel.pdf. 
231 Josh Harper, Seven HLS Campaign Volunteers Arrested by FBI, 
Charged with Terrorism, 24 NO COMPROMISE, http://nocompromise.org/ 
issues/24shac7.html. The list of tactics was originally written by the Research 
Defence Society, “a British lobby group reportedly funded by the pharmaceutical 
industry and universities. Its main focus is to disseminate information about, 
and to defend the use of, animal testing in medicine.” Research Defence Society, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Research_Defence_Society (last visited Nov. 29, 
2007). 
232 Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 16–17. The top of the list read: 
“From the Research Defense Society of the U.K.” Id. 
233 The SHAC USA website acted only as an information clearinghouse, 
and the defendants themselves never indicated that they were going to take part 
in any actions. In fact, the organization “never advocated for anyone to be hurt” 
and the bottom of every webpage contained “a disclaimer that said that [they] do 
not advocate any form of violent activity, and in fact, [they] urge people that 
when they write letters or they send emails, that they’re polite, they’re to the 
point, they’re not threatening in nature.” Democracy Now! Interview, supra note 
101. 
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Furthermore, the actions of the defendants cannot be 
considered intimidation “in the constitutionally proscribable sense 
of the word,” as there is no indication that the defendants directed a 
threat to any individual with the intent of placing them in fear of 
bodily harm or death.234 As the SHAC 7 defendant(s) argued, at 
most, the evidence showed only that 
animal rights activists intended to make the lives of these 
individuals miserable by relentlessly demonstrating in front 
of their homes, causing them embarrassment and emotional 
distress and great inconvenience, with the knowledge that 
this disruption of their lives would continue so long as their 
associations with HLS continued.235 
However, “[s]peech does not lose its protected character . . . 
simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into 
action.”236 
2.  Incitement 
Likewise, the maintenance of the SHAC USA website was not 
directed or likely to incite or produce imminent lawless action.237 A 
claim that certain statements are not protected by the Constitution 
because they incite unlawful action “would be increasingly difficult 
if made against communications via the Web . . . [as] the indirect 
communicative nature of the Internet provides a strong buffer 
between a speaker and a threatened target.”238 Nonetheless, the 
                                                           
234 Id. at 360; cf. United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that a known anti-abortion activist’s actions were a true threat where 
he parked two Ryder trucks at an abortion clinic, knowing that the clinicians 
were aware that a similar one had been used in the Oklahoma City bombing and 
would fear for their lives); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, 
Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding 
that in creating “Guilty” posters and a website where the personal information of 
abortion providers was disclosed, the actions of an anti-abortion organization 
constituted true “threats of force” because they intentionally replicated a pattern 
that preceded the past murders of three providers). 
235 Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 99–100. 
236 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982). 
237 See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
238 Schlosberg, supra note 211, at 78–79. “[I]n Planned Parenthood, 
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case against the SHAC 7 was based primarily on the theory that 
the maintenance of the SHAC USA website “encouraged and 
incited SHAC members and followers to direct their intimidation, 
harassment and violence against HLS and its targeted employees, as 
well as secondary targets . . . in an often successful attempt to get 
those companies to end their business relationships with HLS.”239 
The evidence presented by the government at trial consisted of 
the testimony of employees and former employees of HLS and its 
affiliates detailing instances of harassment, vandalism and property 
damage.240 The government also presented evidence obtained from 
the investigation of the defendants conducted by the FBI and other 
law enforcement officers.241 However, this evidence failed to 
demonstrate either that any of the defendants participated in or 
directed others to participate in criminal activity, 242 or that the 
criminal activity that occurred was an imminent result of the 
defendants’ conduct.243 In fact, vandalism and property damage at 
homes and offices sometimes “occurred within days or weeks of 
SHAC USA’s postings . . . but on other occasions the 
Government’s evidence demonstrated no link at all between 
postings and the actions of anonymous third parties, either because 
                                                           
Judge Kozinski in dissent noted that there was so little chance of proving that 
the posters and website in that case met the imminency requirement in 
Brandenberg that the plaintiffs did not even raise the argument.” United States 
v. Carmichael, 326 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1287 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (citing Planned 
Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1092 n.5 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). 
239 U.S. Attorney’s Press Release, supra note 107. 
240 Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 10. For example, the Chairman of the 
holding company for HLS testified that he received offensive phone calls and 
mail, pictures of him labeled “puppy killer” were posted at his daughter’s 
apartment building, his California home was vandalized, and there were protests 
outside of his New York apartment. Id. at 20. He further testified that he did not 
know who was responsible for these actions, some of which were lawful protest 
activity. Id. 
241 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5–6, United States v. Andrew Stepanian, 
No. 06-4296 (3d Cir. filed Sept. 29, 2006) (this evidence included “surveillance 
of speaking events, protests, demonstrations, marches, electronic surveillance of 
the website as well as phone conversations”). 
242 Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 12. 
243 Id. at 15. 
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the activity occurred before the postings, or months later.”244 The 
link between the speech and the conduct was further weakened 
because the SHAC USA website was often not the exclusive source 
of the information it contained.245 Thus, the government failed to 
show the requisite temporal nexus for the proscription of speech 
under this exception to the First Amendment’s protections.246 At 
worst, the website amounted to nothing more than advocacy of 
illegal action at some indefinite future time, which the Supreme 
Court has held to be protected speech.247 
3.  Crime-Facilitating Speech 
Finally, there is no overarching policy rationale for proscribing 
the SHAC 7’s conduct as impermissible crime-facilitating 
speech.248 In fact, as a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether the 
maintenance of the SHAC USA website facilitated the commission 
of any crime as is required to fall within the possible exception to 
First Amendment protected speech.249 While the website posted 
reports of what had occurred on prior occasions and provided the 
location for possible targets of protest, it did not provide specific 
instructions making it easier for its visitors to commit unlawful acts 
                                                           
244 Id. 
245 Id. at 13 (“Even the Government’s witness admitted . . . that there were 
other animal activist websites which publicized protest information.”). In fact, 
prosecutors called an activist to the stand who had participated in electronic civil 
disobedience (“ECD”) against an affiliate of HLS. SHAC7.com, The Case, 
supra note 96; see Wikipedia, Electronic Civil Disobedience, http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_civil_disobedience (last visited Nov. 25, 2007) 
(ECD refers to a form of protest in which the participants use computer 
technology to carry out their actions, such as flooding a computer server with 
external communications requests, rendering it unable to respond to legitimate 
traffic). The activist testified that SHAC USA had not at all encouraged him to 
take these actions, and that he read about these tactics of common knowledge on 
a number of websites. SHAC7.com, The Case, supra note 96. 
246 See Vitiello, supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
247 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam). 
248 See generally Volokh, supra note 214 (setting forth a test for crime-
facilitating speech). 
249 Id. at 1096. 
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or get away with committing them.250 
However, even assuming that such information can be said to 
constitute crime-facilitating speech, the information contained on 
the SHAC USA website does not fall within the any of the three 
proscribable circumstances posited by Professor Volokh.251 First, 
the website was not available only to a few people which the 
defendants knew were likely to use the information to commit 
unlawful acts.252 The very nature of the Internet is such that its 
content is available to billions of individuals, accessible at any given 
moment. Second, the information posted was relevant for 
noncriminal use.253 In fact, the personal information posted about 
individuals who are affiliated with HLS was used for lawful 
purposes in this case.254 Lastly, it is evident that the information 
provided could not facilitate extraordinarily serious harms, such as 
nuclear or biological attacks.255 Thus, due to the First Amendment 
value of the information contained on the SHAC USA website and 
its inability to result in serious harm, the conduct of the SHAC 7 
was likely insufficient to constitute proscribable crime-facilitating 
speech.  
In sum, the maintenance of the SHAC USA website did not fall 
within any of the exceptions necessary to proscribe the 
fundamental freedom of speech: the information it contained did 
not communicate the requisite intent to constitute a true threat; it 
was not directed or likely to incite or produce imminent lawless 
action; and it could not be proscribed as crime-facilitating speech. 
Accordingly, the convictions of the SHAC 7 for conspiracy to 
violate the AEPA were not in accordance with the First 
Amendment. 
                                                           
250 See id. at 1103. 
251 Id. at 1217. 
252 See id. 
253 See id. 
254 Although the witnesses at trial testified that they were “upset,” 
“scared,” felt “threatened,” or were “concerned” about the demonstrations that 
occurred outside their homes, Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 23–26, a large 
portion of the protests complied with the law and adhered to any injunctions 
that were in place at the time. Id. 
255 See Volokh, supra note 214, at 1217. 
  
868 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
C.   A “Chilling” Effect on the Right to Free Speech 
“[A] statute which . . . forbids . . . the doing of an act in terms 
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first 
essential of due process of law.”256 Michael Ratner, a human rights 
lawyer and vice-president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, 
noted that the AETA and its precursors are unique forms of 
legislation, the vagueness of which “sweep within them basically 
every environmental and animal-rights organization in the 
country.”257 Even under the USA Patriot Act,258 which has come 
under attack by virtually all concerned with the preservation of 
civil liberties,259 the definition of domestic terrorism requires that 
an offense include “acts dangerous to human life,”260 a defining 
element entirely absent from “eco-terrorism” legislation. 
The problematic vagueness of the AEPA became apparent in 
the aftermath of the SHAC 7 convictions. “[T]he terms of a penal 
statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to 
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will 
render them liable to its penalties. . . .”261 This Note argues that the 
AEPA lacked this requisite clarity. The Act provided that 
whoever, for the purpose of causing physical disruption to an 
animal enterprise, intentionally damaged or caused the loss of any 
property used by that enterprise or conspired to do so, was in 
                                                           
256 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
257 Karen Charman, Environmentalists = Terrorists, TOMPAINE.COM, May 
8, 2003, http://www.tompaine.com/Archive/scontent/7748.html. 
258 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 376, § 
802(4) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2001)). 
259 See, e.g., Kevin Bohn, ACLU Files Lawsuit Against Patriot Act, CNN, 
July 30, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/07/30/patriot.act/index.html; 
Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, CCR Wins Great Victory: Key 
Provision of the Patriot Act Ruled Unconstitutional (Jan. 27, 2004), available 
at http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/ccr-wins-great-victory%3A-key-
provision-patriot-act-ruled-unconstitutional. 
260 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, § 802(a)(4). 
261 Connally, 269 U.S. at 391; accord United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 
259, 267 n.6 (1997). 
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violation of the statute.262 This language indicates that only 
physical disruption of an animal enterprise itself, and not economic 
disruption caused by the targeting of affiliated individuals and 
businesses, was prohibited by the statute. Nevertheless, the SHAC 
7 defendants were convicted of animal enterprise terrorism for 
allegedly conspiring with other activists to target the employees 
and affiliates of HLS.263 
Neither the exercise of the speech at issue, nor the conduct that 
allegedly resulted from the speech, was explicitly proscribed by the 
statute.264 In fact, a chief concern of those discontented with the 
AEPA’s protections, and one of the primary bases for the support 
of its amendment, was that it did not address secondary or tertiary 
targeting by activists.265 Accordingly, the AETA expanded the 
scope of the Act to explicitly include such conduct. Because 
Congress felt it was necessary to amend the Act in such a manner, 
it may be inferred that such conduct was not previously intended 
to be proscribed.266 However, even if the Act had been intended to 
address these issues, these lobbying efforts demonstrate that “men 
of common intelligence” necessarily guessed at its meaning and 
differed as to its application, thereby resulting in a violation of due 
process as applied.267 
The conscious and intentional inclusion of disclaimers 
throughout the SHAC USA website clearly illustrate that the 
SHAC 7 defendants outwardly engaged in conduct which they 
believed to be legal.268 Consequently, these convictions have caused 
uncertainty in the minds of animal advocates, some of whom will 
                                                           
262 Animal Enterprise Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(a)(2) (West 2008) 
(as amended in 2002). 
263 See U.S. Attorney’s Press Release, supra note 107. 
264 See Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 (West 
2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006). 
265 See 2004 Hearing, supra note 53 (testimony of William Green, Senior 
V.P. and General Counsel, Chiron Corporation). 
266 See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989) (“Where the words of a later 
statute differ from those of a previous one on the same or related subject, the 
Congress must have intended them to have a different meaning.”). 
267 Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. 
268 See Democracy Now! Interview, supra note 101. 
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inevitably be deterred from engaging in legal activism out of fear 
that they may end up in federal prison.269 As a result, even if 
animal enterprise terrorism legislation is not actively used for 
prosecution, “the very risk of being charged as a terrorist will 
almost certainly have a chilling effect on legitimate activism.”270 
With the introduction of the AETA, Congress was given the 
opportunity to clarify the scope of animal enterprise terrorism 
legislation. However, although the passage of the AETA resolved 
the incongruity with respect to secondary targeting, it has created 
additional issues that are unlikely to be resolved at least until its 
first application. First, while the AEPA required that an individual 
have the purpose of causing physical disruption to an animal 
enterprise, the AETA creates a violation for those who act “for the 
purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an 
animal enterprise.”271 The use of such vague language widens the 
scope of the Act greatly, potentially encompassing purely 
economic damage, civil disobedience and other forms of activism 
that are generally accepted.272 The penalties provision of the 
legislation further supports such an expansive interpretation, as it 
provides a punishment for an offense that does not instill in 
another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death, results 
in no bodily injury, and results in no economic damage.273 
Significantly, the AETA also extends the crime of animal 
enterprise terrorism to situations in which an individual 
“intentionally places a person in reasonable fear of death or serious 
bodily injury” for the purpose of “damaging or interfering with the 
operations of an animal enterprise.”274 Though it is uncontroversial 
                                                           
269 See, e.g., Humane Society, supra note 127. 
270 Id. 
271 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2007) (emphasis added). 
272 See ACLU Letter to House, supra note 132. 
273 18 U.S.C. § 43(b)(1) (2007) (emphasis added). “One explanation for 
this sentencing provision is that it could be intended to target acts of 
‘conspiracy.’” Will Potter, Analysis of Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/wp-content/Images/aeta-analysis-
109th.pdf (July 2007). However, it may also be used to provide a fine and 
imprisonment up to one year for legitimate activity that results in lost profits. 
274 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2007). 
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that individuals should not be threatened with such harm, there 
may be a potential and significant problem with the intent 
requirement if not interpreted narrowly by the judiciary. Those 
who have supported the passage of the AETA have begun a 
“scare-mongering campaign” to create a fear of “eco-terrorists” in 
the public.275 Such efforts, coupled with the fact that activists have 
been named “the number one domestic terrorism threat” by the 
members of the federal government,276 creates a “climate of fear” 
where the objectively reasonable individual may begin to fear 
nonviolent activists.277 
By interpreting the law to require specific intent to place a 
person in fear of death or serious bodily injury, courts may shield 
innocent and lawful behavior from criminal sanction.278 However, if 
the statutory requirement is construed to be one of general intent—
whether the individual intended to engage in acts of vandalism, 
property damage, criminal trespass, or intimidation or conspired to 
do so—the statute may impermissibly infringe upon 
constitutionally protected freedoms or, at best, undesirably 
sanction methods of civil disobedience regularly employed in social 
justice movements as terrorism.279 
                                                           
275 See Potter, supra note 273. For example, the children’s film Hoot, 
based on the prize-winning novel by Carl Hiaasen, has been labeled “soft-core 
eco-terrorism,” as it tells the story of young teenagers who break the law to 
sabotage a construction site and protect the habitat of burrowing owls. Marc 
Morano, New Movie Called ‘Soft Core Eco-terrorism’ for Kids, CNSNEWS, 
May 1, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewSpecialReports.asp?Page=/ 
SpecialReports/archive/200605/SPE20060501a.html. Further, after the New 
York Stock Exchange announced it would not list the public offering of HLS, an 
anonymous full-page ad was run in the New York Times depicting a man in a 
black ski mask with the headline “I Control Wall Street” and noting that 
“NYSE employees were reportedly threatened by animal rights activists,” a 
claim that remains entirely unsubstantiated. NYSE Hostage, http:// 
nysehostage.com/ads.asp (last visited Nov. 25, 2007). 
276 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 54–67. 
277 Potter, supra note 273 (“Through scare-mongering, the unreasonable 
becomes reasonable.”). 
278 See generally, Brief for Center for Constitutional Rights, et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 21-6, United States v. Stop Huntingdon 
Animal Cruelty, Inc., No. 06-4211 (3rd Cir. Oct. 29, 2007). 
279 Id. 
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Finally, the illusory exemptions contained in the AETA are 
unsuccessful in alleviating these concerns regarding the scope of the 
legislation. The drafters included a section entitled “Rules of 
Construction,” stating: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed—(1) to prohibit 
any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or 
other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal 
prohibition by the First Amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) to create new remedies for interference with activities 
protected by the free speech or free exercise clauses of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution, regardless of the 
point of view expressed, or to limit any existing legal 
remedies for such interference; or (3) to provide exclusive 
criminal penalties or civil remedies with respect to the 
conduct prohibited by this action, or to preempt State or 
local laws that may provide such penalties or remedies.280 
However, these provisions do not serve the same purpose as the 
amendments recommended by the ACLU in its letter to the House 
Judiciary Committee to make the bill less likely to chill or threaten 
free speech.281 In fact, these provisions state nothing more than the 
elementary proposition that a statute may not override a 
Constitutional right.282 Despite the drafter’s alleged precautionary 
measures, the AETA should not survive a constitutional 
challenge.283 
It is unlikely that the AETA will stop the underground, illegal 
direct action that it was allegedly designed to prevent.284 Property 
                                                           
280 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(e) (2007). 
281 ACLU Letter to House, supra note 132. 
282 See Potter, supra note 273. 
283 See id. 
284 See Steven Mitchell, Analysis: Bill targets animal activists, UNITED 
PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 14, 2006, http://www.upi.com/Health_Business/ 
Analysis/2006/11/14/analysis_bill_targets_animal_activists/5048/ (Dr. Jerry 
Vlasak, a trauma surgeon and spokesman for the North American Animal 
Liberation Press Office, noted that “[a]s far as the underground [animal] 
liberation movement, [the AETA] won’t have any impact at all because . . . 
[t]heir activities—sabotaging, liberating animals—are already illegal so just 
adding one more law won’t make much difference.”). 
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damage, vandalism, harassment, intimidation, and any other acts 
that aggressive animal rights activists may commit in furtherance of 
their goals that are not entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment were plainly unlawful even prior to this ideology-
specific legislation.285 The presence of penalties for these actions 
has never been a deterrent in the past,286 and their increase is not 
likely to significantly influence a decision to engage in illegal direct 
action.287 
Despite activists’ resilience in the past, these further sanctions 
are likely to deter aboveground activists who attend protests and 
publicly voice their dissent, resulting in one of two possible 
undesirable outcomes. First, these individuals may fear expressing 
their opinions and their desire for change, thereby inhibiting the 
crucial “uninhibited marketplace of ideas” rationale behind the First 
Amendment.288 In contrast, other individuals may be persuaded to 
resort to clandestine activities and simply hope that they will not 
be caught.289 An examination of ALF activities and those of the 
                                                           
285 See id. 
286 Addressing the court at his sentencing on November 8th, 2005, Peter 
Young stated: 
I am not without my regrets. I am here today to be sentenced for my 
participation in releasing mink from 6 fur farms. I regret it was only 6. 
I’m also here today to be sentenced for my participation in the freeing 
of 8,000 mink from those farms. I regret it was only 8,000. It is my 
understanding of those 6 farms, only 2 of them have since shut down. I 
regret it was only 2. More than anything, I regret my restraint, because 
whatever damage we did to those businesses, if those farms were left 
standing, and if one animal was left behind, then it wasn’t enough. 
SupportPeter.com, Statements, http://supportpeter.com/statements.htm (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2007). 
287 See Mitchell, supra note 284. 
288 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 395 U.S. 
367, 390 (1969). Further fostering a fear of expressing dissent by strictly legal 
means, industry groups have accused even the most benign animal protection 
organizations, such as the Humane Society of the United States, of “consorting 
with terrorists.” See Potter, supra note 12. 
289 Mitchell, supra note 284 (Camille Hankins of activist organization Win 
Animal Rights noted that by shepherding this legislation, the industry 
“could’ve taken a step that will create their worst nightmare,” because the 
increase in penalties may drive more people “underground because there will be 
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SHAC 7 reveals that it is perhaps a greater risk to post information 
on a website than to put on all black attire and a balaclava, travel to 
a fur farm or animal testing facility, and proceed to destroy 
thousands of dollars worth of equipment and release animals from 
captivity. The freedom to communicate one’s ideas without fear of 
prosecution is essential to diminish the belief that illegal direct 
action is the most effective means to prevent the death of 
nonhuman animals. 
CONCLUSION 
The convictions of the SHAC 7 should not be perceived as 
merely affecting the contemporary animal rights movement because 
the legal implications that arise from branding activists as 
“terrorists” concern all individuals who advocate political and 
social change.290 The SHAC campaign, as well as other animal 
rights organizations that engage in direct action, have developed 
effective strategies and methodological approaches to activism that 
are highly significant for all matters of social justice, advocacy and 
political struggle.291 
When Congress creates legislation to proscribe the actions of 
advocates for one side of a debate, it must cautiously avoid 
silencing the discussion and dissent so fundamental to the 
significance of the First Amendment.292 The AEPA, as first passed 
in 1992, appears to have been drafted to effectively balance the 
competing interests of activists and the federal government.293 The 
text of the legislation protected animal rights advocacy by 
proscribing a relatively narrow range of activities, while also 
recognizing the governmental interest of protecting corporate 
interests from theft, vandalism and physical disruption.294 
However, application of and amendments to this legislation have 
                                                           
little incentive to remain ‘above ground’ with one’s identity revealed.”). 
290 Best & Kahn, supra note 93 at 3, 4. 
291 Id. at 3. 
292 ACLU Letter to House, supra note 132, at 3. 
293 See Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 (West 
2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006). 
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progressively tipped the scale in favor of corporate interests.295 By 
appealing to the unrelenting lobbying efforts of industry groups, 
Congress has effectively disregarded the concern for protection of 
the legitimate activities of grassroots activists.296 Accepting the 
industry’s unsupported claims that further measures were 
necessary to criminalize already illegal activities, Congress adopted 
the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, a statute that not only failed 
to address the problems inherent in the AEPA’s revisions, but 
expanded the protections of those profiting from animal 
exploitation in terms even more vague and overbroad.297 
In light of the SHAC 7 convictions and the passage of the 
AETA, it is necessary for Congress to reexamine the purposes for 
which it serves. At the start of each new Congress, representatives 
must “solemnly swear that [they] will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.”298 Accordingly, if it is 
encouraged that a proposed bill be passed to proscribe criminal 
conduct, Congress must make some concerted effort to verify that 
the bill would accomplish that end without infringing upon 
fundamental freedoms. In adopting legislation that impermissibly 
proscribes activities traditionally protected by the First 
Amendment, Congress abandons its duty to defend the 
Constitution. 
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